During a trip to East Asia in November 2009, President Barack Obama identified himself
as "America's first Pacific President," communicating his intent to bring the U.S. foreign policy focus back to the Asian Pacific. 1 Correspondingly, the language in the 2010 National Security Strategy focused on engagement and cooperation centered in shared interests of Asian Pacific prosperity, security, and global cooperation on "violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and global economic instability." 2 In the wake of the U.S. drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration renewed its avowed commitment. On a subsequent trip in November 2011, President Obama coined the U.S. "pivot" to Asia, raising serious concerns and uncertainty on both sides of the Pacific as to exactly what this "pivot" means for the future of U.S. policy in the Asian Pacific. 3 Since the beginning of the Cold War, U.S. policy in the Asian Pacific region has ranged from containment to engagement to hedging; however, a common characteristic of strategic ambiguity has served to preserve the status quo. Despite the changing strategic environment, this approach has ushered in U.S. primacy and fostered the rise of China to great power status. U.S. policy in the Asian Pacific under the Obama administration is currently prioritizing continued U.S. primacy and national interests of stability, security and prosperity; however, if the administration does not maintain an approach of strategic ambiguity, the status quo will change from prosperous U.S.-Sino cooperation and engagement to undesirable great power competition.
After the Obama administration publicized its intentions to rebalance U.S. strategy in the Asian Pacific, the debate ensued as to what exactly the "pivot" represents for U.S. policy.
Liberal internationalists view China's economic prosperity as a product of the U.S.-led liberal international order, a status quo which neither China nor the United States seeks to change. 4 From this perspective, increased U.S. focus on the Asian Pacific is about strengthening cooperation with China and her neighbors. Realists, on the other hand, believe China is seeking to increase influence and control of its security environment, and that the U.S. strategic rebalance is aimed at sustaining U.S. primacy by denying or containing a rising competitor. 5 Past U.S.
policy vis-à-vis China answers this debate by revealing how strategic ambiguity walked the fine line between realist and liberal approaches. This strategic approach will continue to serve U.S.
national interests as the United States rebalances its strategic focus to the Asian Pacific.
Strategic ambiguity is a foreign policy approach for security environments in which great power confrontation is undesirable. Strategic ambiguity is the paradoxical concept that a state with sufficient influence may sustain stability in a crisis situation by increasing uncertainty. 6 It is paradoxical because crisis resolution normally involves reducing uncertainty by clearly defining means and ways to achieve an outcome that alters the status quo to resolve the crisis.
The primary mechanism in the strategic ambiguity approach is deterrence. Ambiguity about how certain behaviors will be rewarded or punished circumvents gaming and induces compliance or cooperation. 7 When a principal state pursues an ambiguous approach, states within the system facing a crisis will sustain the status quo because they are uncertain about the principal's response to any other behavior. Preserving the status quo requires stabilizing the situation, despite the existing crisis, by deliberately avoiding transparency about what actions other than sustaining the status quo will garner a response and what form that response will take. 8 When applying the above definition to a foreign policy approach, it is necessary to emphasize that the ambiguity is in means and ways, not ends. 9 The principal state clearly defines and communicates national interests, but it reserves information on how and when to apply instruments of national power.
Although the disputed issues are unresolved, sustainment of the status quo prevents escalation to direct confrontation, including interstate violence and war. Status quo exists in three variants: behavioral, contractual, and territorial; but, for the purposes of international relations and the relevance of strategic ambiguity, status quo is defined as the "mutually perceptive distribution of rights and privileges" with respect to territory and sovereign rights to that territory. 10 This definition purposely separates the means and ways inherent in behavioral and contractual elements from the ends of sustaining territorial sovereignty rights and privileges.
What ultimately risks war are perceptions of intent and outright attempts to change the territorial status quo without mutual consent. 11 As this paper will describe, the strategic ambiguity approach leverages behavioral and contractual elements of foreign policy to sustain this status quo and avert direct conflict.
For the United States, the approach of strategic ambiguity has served to balance realist and liberal views in international relations to avoid confrontation with China. State behavior under realism focuses on sovereignty and a balance of power approach to international relations, not internal aspects like government and leadership. 12 Idealism, or liberalism, mitigates the power approach through international institutions and prefers governments that adopt liberal democratic values and choose cooperative policies. 13 A realist approach of self-help in an anarchical order may promote stability and prosperity absent concern for internal state dynamics;
however, this approach may also be inharmonious for a state like the United States that emphasizes liberal values of individual equality and freedoms of religion, speech, and press. While democracy has underpinned prosperity and stability for the United States, other great powers' strategic characteristics-e.g. history, culture, geography-are potentially incongruent with democracy. In such cases, strategic ambiguity provides a foreign policy approach to balance national interests of stability and prosperity from a realist perspective with the promotion of democratic liberal reforms.
To observe the strategic ambiguity approach in past and present U.S. policy for the Asian Pacific, identifying specific behaviors that result in successful application provides an evaluative framework. The approach requires clear and methodical signaling to (1) avoid imposing selfrighteousness, or superiority; (2) avoid pursuing quick closure to crises; (3) pursue "unified diversity" built on global cooperation, not "focused wrongness" backed up by dominance and power; and (4) Since the beginning of the 21st Century, U.S. concerns in the Asian Pacific have centered on China's rise to great power status; however, strategic ambiguity has continued to characterize the U.S. policy approach. Departing from Clinton's idealist approach to China, the George W.
Bush administration adopted a realist hedging policy focused on preserving U.S. primacy. 34 The administration enhanced defense ties with Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Negotiations following the EP-3 incident before the events of September 11, 2001, provided another demonstration of the value of strategic ambiguity in U.S. policy toward China.
The crisis centered on compelling one side to accept blame for causing the accident that resulted in the loss of the Chinese pilot and aircraft. 36 Restoring harmony and avoiding further damage to U.S.-Sino relations required delicate negotiations to create unified diversity while avoiding focused wrongness. Had China agreed to a quick resolution defined by fulfilling the U.S. request for immediate return of the EP-3 aircraft and crew, it would have signaled the efficacy of U.S.
intimidation. 37 The negotiation process permitted a status quo defined by two diverse interpretations of the incident, no acceptance of blame for the accident itself, return of the aircraft and crew to the U.S., and China's ability to diplomatically avoid legitimizing U.S.
coercion. This event underscores the fine line the United States must walk through the application of strategic ambiguity in U.S. policy for the 21st Century.
Today, the United States faces a unipolar security environment defined by significant regional and global challenges, but China's rise continues to garner special attention. Although state and non-state actors combined with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and violent extremism remain on the list of global challenges, the Asian Pacific region presents concerns core to U.S. national interests of stability, prosperity, and free market principles.
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China's rising economic and military power but perceived limited transparency cause apprehension for U.S. allies in the region, potentially impacting U.S. security commitments.
Most significantly, China's rise creates uncertainty about continued global U.S. leadership of the rules-based international order.
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By pursuing a grand strategy of primacy juxtaposed with China's rise and core national interests, the United States has and will continue to face potential dangers to security, stability, and prosperity in the Asian Pacific region. According to Samuel Huntington, Century, three on-going territorial issues exemplify the diverse nature of U.S. commitments:
Taiwan, the Senkaku islands, and the South China Sea.
As the bedrock of strategic ambiguity in U.S. policy, the Taiwan Finally, the administration focused on relationship building through several official visits on both sides of the Pacific, including the initiation of biennial "strategic dialogues" as well as increased military exchange opportunities. 45 The sustainment and improvement of U.S.-Sino relations, despite Chen's aggressive posturing and in the absence of a common adversary, illustrates how a strategic ambiguity approach continues to serve U.S. national interests in the 21st Century.
The Senkaku islands dispute between China and Japan represents a more recent challenge to U.S. interests and continued strategic ambiguity. In late 2012, the Japanese government purchased the privately owned Senkaku islands and reasserted administrative control, drawing harsh criticism from China and Taiwan. 46 Under Article V of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security obligation to defend Japan. 47 Because the treaty language does not follow the ambiguous design involvement in what they see as bilateral issues. 49 The language in the U.S.
-Philippines Mutual
Defense Treaty is consistent with a strategic ambiguous approach as it is unclear whether the commitment extends to the islands; and, despite requests from foreign policy experts to clarify the conditions of the treaty, the Obama administration has avoided transparency. 50 This presents another risk of strategic ambiguity in U.S. policy because, although the treaty language is ambiguous, if the Philippine government or other Asian Pacific allies are sufficiently uncertain about U.S. commitment, they may upset the status quo by devaluing U.S. support and expanding their own defensive capabilities to balance against China's rise.
As the U.S. security arrangements with Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines illustrate, methodical signaling and conditional commitments are necessary for strategic ambiguity.
Stephen Walt argues international credibility as the champion of other nation's security was a
Cold War necessity no longer relevant in the post-Cold War world. "The bottom line is that the United States is in a terrific position to play realpolitik on a global scale, precisely because it needs alliance partners less than most of its partners do." 51 When the United States places concerns for sustaining credibility above national interests, the United States relinquishes leverage to "weaker partners," thereby constraining its capacity to engage in meaningful diplomacy. He concludes, sarcastically, "it's a radical position: we are simply going to pursue the American national interest, instead of letting our allies around the world define it for us."
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That American national interest is global U.S. leadership, or primacy, to ensure security, stability, prosperity and a continued liberal international order.
As the Obama administration continues rebalancing to the Asian Pacific, following three recommendations will promote regional stability, security, and prosperity, and reduce the potential for U.S. unlikely China's neighbors will balance or bandwagon. By free riding, however, they will undermine U.S. strategic ambiguity by pursuing unambiguous security commitments that leave America hard-pressed to avoid involvement in regional disagreements. U.S. policymakers must find the operating space between emboldening and abandoning allies and partners, outside of which they are more likely to take actions that destabilize the Asian Pacific.
Third and finally, while continued global U.S. leadership will require a nuanced approach to China's rise characterized by strategic ambiguity, it will also require continued emphasis on the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of national power. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, called on China to become a "responsible stakeholder" and help in shaping the international system. 55 Globalization, the rise of transnational organizations and groups, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and climate change together present a host of dynamic security and stability challenges for which the world has traditionally turned to unsurpassed U.S. capacity and capability. Considering domestic and international security and prosperity that have coincided with the era of U.S. primacy, it should come as no surprise that U.S. interests are fundamentally about sustaining global leadership. This position has allowed the United States to influence international affairs through the development of a liberal international order that ensures the protection of Americans and America's interests, domestic and overseas, including access to vital resources. However, the United States cannot premise continued primacy on misapplication of Cold War principles in the face of a rising China.
As the history of U.S. policy illustrates, the methodical application of strategic ambiguity has underpinned U.S. national interests, promoted regional security and prosperity for Taiwan, and fostered the rise of China. The Cold War established the U.S. as the world power and champion of security, stability, prosperity, and liberal democracy. With these sustaining attributes, effectively implementing strategic ambiguity relies considerably on embracing cultural diversity in cooperative problem-solving, avoiding quick resolution and focused wrongness, remaining ambiguous in conditional security commitments to Asian Pacific allies, and strengthening all instruments of U.S. national power to defend American interests. The full nature of the U.S. strategic pivot to the Asian Pacific is, for the moment, creating uncertainty.
To the extent that the United States is able to harness this uncertainty within a deliberate approach of strategic ambiguity, the status quo that has underpinned regional stability and economic prosperity will continue.
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